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Baby Tinslee Lewis was born in late February 2019 with a rare heart 
defect and was placed on extracorporeal membrane oxygenation, a machine 
that fulfilled the functions of her heart and lungs.1 By the time she was ten 
months old, Cook Children’s Medical Center in Fort Worth, Texas, stated 
that her condition required long-term life-sustaining treatment and that 
simple palliative care such as feeding and bathing could cause serious 
complications.2 Her physicians wanted to terminate their care for Tinslee 
because they believed that continuing care was only postponing an inevitable 
death, but Tinslee’s mother wanted to continue treatment.3  
Cook Children’s Hospital determined that further treatment of 
Tinslee would be futile, and her mother was forced to begin a search for 
other providers willing to accept the child.4 After contacting over twenty 
hospitals, none were willing to accept a child in such critical condition.5 On 
December 4, 2019, Cook Children’s Hospital officially reported that no 
facilities were willing to accept Tinslee, thus triggering a ten-day waiting 
period required by law under the Texas Advanced Directives Act (TADA) 
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1 Charlotte Huff, Texas Law Highlights Dilemma Over Care for Patients with no Hope of 
Survival, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Dec. 23, 2019), https://khn.org/news/texas-law-highlights-
dilemma-over-care-for-patients-with-no-hope-of-survival/ [https://perma.cc/7D7H-7K2H]. 
2 Id.  
3 Kaley Johnson, Caring for Fort Worth Baby on Life Support is ‘Emotionally Difficult,’ her 
Nurse Says, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM (Mar. 1, 2020), https://www.star-
telegram.com/news/local/fort-worth/article240692506.html [https://perma.cc/YG6C-
PUGG]. 
4 Huff, supra note 1. 
5 Id.  
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before life-sustaining treatment could be terminated without parental 
consent.6  
If, by the end of the ten days, Tinslee’s mother could not find a 
facility willing to accept her, then Cook Children’s Medical Center could 
stop treatment, effectively terminating her life.7 Tinslee’s family secured a 
temporary restraining order against the hospital until January 2, 2020, at 
which time the hospital was free to terminate care.8 Tinslee’s family, 
continuing to fight for her life, argued her case to continue treatment in front 
of the Texas State Court of Appeals in Fort Worth on February 4, 2020.9 
As of March 1, 2020, the court has not issued an opinion.10 
Medical futility disputes like Tinslee’s can be some of the most 
frustrating problems facing healthcare professionals.11 This article will 
consider medical futility disputes such as Tinslee’s and how the faulty 
allocation of decision-making power currently plaguing these disputes can 
be alleviated by incorporating elements of the precautionary principle. Part 
I discusses factors common to futility disputes that make such disputes 
particularly contentious. Part II discusses the definitional approach to 
medical futility disputes and the shortcomings of this method. Part III 
discusses the modern process-based approach to solving medical futility 
disputes and its shortcomings. Part IV discusses the precautionary principle 
and its role as a decision-making tool for environmental protection. Finally, 
Part V shows how the major problems discussed in Parts II and III are 
solved by applying the framework of the precautionary principle to medical 
futility disputes.  
I. A BRIEF LOOK AT THE COMMON FEATURES OF 
MEDICAL FUTILITY DISPUTES 
 As is clear from the story of Tinslee Lewis, medical futility 
disputes are fraught with difficulty. While medical futility has proven 
difficult to define specifically, it arises when a physician believes continuing 
treatment is medically or ethically inappropriate, but the patient or surrogate 




9 Johnson, supra note 3. 
10 Id. On January 2, 2020, a second request for a temporary injunction was denied. On July 
24, 2020, the Second Court of Appeals reversed the denial of the temporary injunction and 
remanded for further proceedings. The Texas Supreme Court declined to hear the case. 
Daniel Friend, Cook Children’s Motion in Tinslee Lewis Case Denied by Texas Supreme 
Court, Child to Remain on Life Support, THE TEXAN (Oct. 19, 2020), 
https://thetexan.news/cook-childrens-motion-in-tinslee-lewis-case-denied-by-texas-supreme-
court-child-to-remain-on-life-support/ [https://perma.cc/R6N9-JE9A].  
11 Robert D. Truog, Medical Futility, 25 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 985, 986 (2009). 
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disagrees, preferring to continue treatment.12 There are several factors that 
make medical futility disputes particularly contentious: the life-and-death 
stakes,13 allocation of scarce medical resources,14 and differing faith or 
values.15  
 Most medical futility disputes arise over the beginning or 
continuation of life-sustaining medical treatment.16 The Supreme Court 
noted in Cruzan v. Director of the Missouri Department of Health that 
heightened interests exist when medical decisions will likely result in the 
death of the patient.17 These life-and-death decisions are “deeply personal” 
and “overwhelmingly final” for all parties involved.18 Because such disputes 
center on life-sustaining treatment, “withholding or withdrawing life-
sustaining medical treatment will result in the patient’s death.”19 Not only do 
the family members have strong feelings about these decisions,20 but so also 
does the state, as demonstrated by the severity of punishment for murders 
and laws against assisted suicide.21 There is no disinterested party.   
 In addition to the interests of life and death, there is the 
unavoidable issue of conservation of medical resources.22 Medical futility 
cases almost always involve questions of healthcare costs and allocation of 
resources.23 For example, a futility dispute would not arise over a surrogate’s 
demand for vitamin C to treat an aggressive form of cancer, even though it 
would have no meaningful effect on the disease and could be considered 
futile.24 Conversely, if the same patient requested a limited treatment that 
was prohibitively expensive with little or no chance of success, then a 
physician would be more likely to object to expending that treatment on 
such a patient.25  While futility disputes and conservation of resources seem 
                                                           
12 See Jon D. Feldhammer, Medical Torture: End of Life Decision-Making in the United 
Kingdom and United States, 14 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 511, 520 (2006). 
13 Thaddeus Mason Pope, Procedural Due Process and Intramural Hospital Dispute 
Resolution Mechanisms: The Texas Advance Directives Act, 10 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. 
& POL’Y 93, 97 (2017) [hereinafter Pope, Procedural Due Process]. 
14 Truog, supra note 11, at 990. 
15 Teneille R. Brown, Medical Futility and Religious Free Exercise, 15 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 
43, 53–54 (2016). 
16 Pope, Procedural Due Process, supra note 13, at 97.  
17 497 U.S. 261, 281 (1990). 
18 Id. 
19 Thaddeus Mason Pope, Dispute Resolution Mechanisms for Intractable Medical Futility 
Disputes, 58 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 347, 351 (2014) [hereinafter Pope, Dispute Resolution 
Mechanisms]. 
20 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 286. 
21 Id. at 280. 
22 Truog, supra note 11, at 990. 
23 Id. at 990–91. 
24 Id. at 991. 
25 Id.  
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to go hand in hand,26 scholars like Schneiderman have pointed out that 
money or rationing of medical resources and futility determinations are 
separate considerations.27 Rationing refers only to the allocation of scarce 
treatments among patients, whereas futility involves determining how 
beneficial those treatments will be to a given patient.28 Thus, determining 
futility and denial of care to a patient should have nothing to do with 
allocating medical resources.29 
 The final difficulty concerning medical futility disputes is the 
differing concepts of faith and morals that arise between the patient or 
surrogate and their physicians. For example, in the Roman Catholic 
tradition, persons have the moral obligation to provide and receive care for 
medical ailments.30 This duty extends to those surrounding and caring for 
the patient.31 However, the duty to give and accept care is not mandated in 
every situation.32 Pope Pius XII stated that man has the right and moral 
obligation to take necessary treatment for the preservation of life and health, 
but this normally extends only to ordinary means that do not involve grave 
burdens for oneself or another.33 Thus, if the medical treatment is ordinary, 
then a physician is morally obliged to offer such treatment, but if it is 
extraordinary, then there is no moral obligation for the physician or patient 
to pursue it.34 In other words, a Catholic patient or their surrogate could be 
morally bound to make a decision out of a sense of duty, which is not shared 
by a secular healthcare provider.35  
 Tensions involving religious beliefs are prevalent in medical 
futility disputes because religious fervor and moral convictions often 
increase the closer one is to death.36 However, doctors have become more 
secular and less concerned with their patient’s newly discovered spiritual 
                                                           
26 Id. at 990–91. 
27 Lawrence J. Schneiderman, Nancy S. Jecker & Albert R. Jonsen, Medical Futility: 
Response to Critiques, 125 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 669, 673 (1996) [hereinafter 
Schneiderman et al., Medical Futility: Response to Critiques]. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. See also Truog, supra note 11, at 990. 




34 Peter A. Clark, Medical Futility: Legal and Ethical Analysis, 9 AM. MED. ASS’N J. ETHICS 
375, 382 n.23 (2007) (“Ordinary means of preserving life are all medicines, treatments, and 
operations, which offer a reasonable hope of benefit for the patient and which can be 
obtained and used without excessive expense, pain or other inconvenience, [e]xtraordinary 
means are all medicines, treatments, and operations, which cannot be obtained or used 
without excessive expense, pain or other inconvenience, or which if used, would not offer a 
reasonable hope of benefit.”) (citation omitted). 
35 See Brown, supra note 15, at 44. 
36 Id. at 49. 
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fervor.37 The increased separation between the spirituality of the patient and 
their physicians often causes difficulty and conflict in determining end-of-
life care.38 This disconnect, resulting from opposing viewpoints between 
religious patients and their secular counterparts, can cause an increase in 
the percentage of futility disputes.39 The particular factors of life-and-death 
stakes, rationing of medical resources, and an increase in spiritual faith or 
values, while only a few of the difficulties involved in medical futility 
disputes,40 paint a picture of the quagmire that policymakers, legislators, 
scholars, and physicians must wade through to reach a morally amicable 
solution between patients, their surrogates, and physicians. 
II.  THE DEFINITIONAL APPROACH TO MEDICAL FUTILITY 
 Scholars attempted to balance the competing factors in medical 
futility disputes and find a workable resolution to futility disputes by defining 
medical futility.41 In 1990, Schneiderman and other experts in the field of 
medical futility proposed a method by which doctors could terminate care 
in medically-futile cases based on an objective determination of medical 
futility.42 The definitional approach to medical futility states that if a 
physician determines that a treatment meets the criteria for futility, then 
such treatment should be withheld.43 Under this definitional approach, the 
futility determination would be made by the physician, consulting with other 
healthcare professionals but without input or consent from the family or 
surrogate.44 
 Schneiderman’s first step in defining futility was to consider the 
ultimate goal of the treatment and distinguish it from a physiological effect 
of treatment.45 Certain treatments can have a desired and expected 
physiological effect. But if those effects do not move the patient closer 
                                                           
37 See id. at 51–52 (discussing religion, hospital service, and death in modern hospitals). 
38 Id. at 52. 
39 Lucas S. Zier, Jeffrey H. Burack, Guy Micco, Anne K. Chipman, James A. Frank & 
Douglas B. White, Surrogate Decision Makers’ Responses to Physicians’ Predictions of 
Medical Futility, 136 CHEST 110, 114 (2009). 
40 This note will not attempt to address all aspects of medical futility because “it is the [better] 
part of wisdom not to attempt, by any general statement, to cover every possible phase of the 
subject.” Cruzan v. Dir. Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (quoting Twin City 
Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196 (1897)). 
41 Lawrence J. Schneiderman, Nancy S. Jecker & Albert R. Jonsen, Medical Futility: Its 
Meaning and Ethical Implications, 112 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 949, 949 (1990) 
[hereinafter Schneiderman et al., Medical Futility: Its Meaning]. 
42 Id.  
43 Id. 
44 Id.  
45 Id. at 950.  
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toward their ultimate goal of recovery, then it is futile.46 For example, insulin 
given to a patient sick with pneumonia would produce the desired 
physiological effect on the patient’s blood sugar but would in no way affect 
the ultimate goal of curing the patient of pneumonia.47 Or, in more chilling 
terms, “nutritional support could effectively preserve a host of organ systems 
in a patient in persistent vegetative state, but fail to restore a conscious and 
sapient life.”48 Hence, treatments that fail to restore well-being or a general 
state of health are considered futile by Schneiderman’s definitional 
approach, and the physician in those cases should terminate treatment.49 
Distinguishing the physiological effect from the ultimate goal of treatment 
allows the attainability of the end goal to become the standard by which 
treatment is deemed successful or futile.50 If the treatment will achieve the 
goal of restoring a patient to health, then it is not futile, but if it will not 
restore health, then it is futile. According to Schneiderman, the physician 
should have the sole power to determine the goal of the patient and what 
treatments will or will not achieve that goal, giving him the sole power in a 
futility dispute.51 
 Schneiderman proposed two separate thresholds for determining 
medical futility: quantitative and qualitative.52 Quantitative futility exists 
when there is a low probability of success in achieving the end goal of a state 
of health.53 Schneiderman proposed a one-percent quantitative threshold, 
stating that “when physicians conclude . . . that in the last 100 cases, a 
medical treatment has been useless, they should regard it as futile.”54 This 
one-percent rule can be based either on the doctor’s experience or on 
empirical studies,55 both of which completely exclude the family or surrogate 
and render them powerless.56   
Qualitative futility exists when the treatment does not produce a 
beneficial outcome that would allow a patient to lead a meaningful life, even 
if it has the desired physiological effect.57 Under qualitative futility, once the 
doctor determines that the end goal of restoring a “meaningful” life is no 
longer achievable, the patient and surrogate lose the right to choose their 
                                                           
46 Id.  
47 Id. 
48 Id.  
49 Id.  
50 Id.  
51 See id.  
52 Id. at 951. 
53 Id. 
54 Id.  
55 Id. at 951–52.  
56 Id. at 952–53. 
57 Id. 
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treatment plan, and the doctor may terminate care.58 This is because “the 
patient has no right to be sustained in a state in which he or she has no 
purpose other than mere vegetative survival; the physician has no obligation 
to offer this option or services to achieve it.”59 This loss of the right to choose 
treatment is not limited simply to patients existing in persistent vegetative 
states.60 Schneiderman extends the qualitative futility determination to 
include patients whose future predictable lives would be regulated to 
“constant monitoring, ventilatory support, and intensive care nursing . . . 
[or] overwhelming suffering.”61 Under the qualitative threshold, the 
physician extends their professional discretion over and above human life, 
making a value-laden decision about the patient’s quality of life.62 If, in their 
opinion, the patient cannot “achieve any other life goals,” then treatment 
ought to be terminated.63 
The first difficulty with a quantitative approach to determining 
futility arises with accurately determining the likelihood that the treatment 
will be successful.64 Scoring systems in intensive care units attempt to 
determine futility quantitatively by taking into account factors like “poor 
prognosis, minimal chance of survival, and high probability of death.”65 
However, these techniques for determining a percentage of success for a 
given treatment were developed with large samples and thus can be 
misleading when applied to a particular individual.66  
Reaching a high level of certainty regarding the effectiveness of 
treatments in particular cases is difficult.67 Some studies claim that a 
particular treatment in certain circumstances will have a one hundred 
percent mortality rate but fail to include a sample size large enough to 
exclude the possibility that some individuals may survive.68 Other studies 
claim that a treatment is medically futile but fail to actually meet the most 
common standard—less than one percent success rate—for quantitative 
futility.69  
                                                           
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 952. 
60 Id. 
61 Id.  
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 952–53. 
64 See Maryam Aghabarary & Nahid Dehghan Nayeri, Medical Futility and Its Challenges: A 




67 See Dominic J. Wilkinson & Julian Savulescu, Knowing When to Stop: Futility in the 
Intensive Care Unit, 24 CURRENT OP. ANESTHESIOLOGY 160, 161 (2011), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3252683/ [https://perma.cc/2L2K-HURN]. 
68 Id. at 162. 
69 Aghabarary & Dehghan, supra note 64. 
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In addition to the difficulties of accurately predicting the chance of 
success,70 attaching a percentage-based threshold to futility and terminating 
treatment based on that percentage becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.71 
When life support or other medical treatment is removed “because of a 
predicted high risk of dying, the measured mortality rates will be artificially 
elevated.”72 Establishing an artificial percentage-based threshold at which the 
patient’s life will be effectively terminated contributes to the mortality rate, 
only further entrenching and solidifying the artificially high statistics upon 
which the percentage is based.73 
Even if a physician were to know with absolute certainty that the 
chance of success is less than one percent, this statistical certainty does not 
solve the actual dispute between the physician and the patient or surrogate.74 
A bright-line rule for a medical futility determination does not end the 
conflict because futility judgments are subjective.75 A doctor may believe that 
the chance of recovery is very low, but to a patient or their surrogate, any 
chance may be worth the risk.76 A study published by the American College 
of Chest Physicians indicated that thirty-two percent of surrogates would 
choose to continue life support even when there was less than one percent 
chance of survival.77 Even presented with no chance of survival, eighteen 
percent of surrogates would still choose to maintain life support.78  
Furthermore, patients and surrogates with religious convictions are 
more likely to continue life support than their secular counterparts.79 For a 
patient and their family, “a chance of one percent is much better than no 
chance.”80 Thus, even though physicians attempt to standardize their futility 
determinations, their quantitative results are considered subjectively by the 
patients, and thus the conflict between physicians and surrogates cannot be 
resolved by a quantitative definition of futility.  
In considering the qualitative definition of futility, similar difficulties 
arise.81 When making a futility determination based on qualitative futility, 
the doctor passes judgment not only on whether the patient’s goals are 
                                                           
70 See id.  
71 Wilkinson & Savulescu, supra note 67, at 162. 
72 Id.  
73 See id. 
74 Id. at 161.  
75 Id. 
76 Id.  
77 Zier et al., supra note 39, at 114. 
78 Id.  
79 Id.  
80 Aghabarary & Dehghan, supra note 64. 
81 See Thaddeus Mason Pope, Medical Futility Statutes: No Safe Harbor to Unilaterally 
Refuse Life-Sustaining Treatment, 75 TENN. L. REV. 1, 5 (2007) [hereinafter Pope, Medical 
Futility Statutes]. 
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achievable (as with quantitative futility) but also whether those goals are 
worthwhile.82 A doctor may determine that a treatment has little or no value 
because, from their point of view, the patient’s future life will be too 
debilitating to be valuable.83 However, when faced with equating the value 
of a life based on the quality of life, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts 
stated that “to the extent that this formulation equates value of life with any 
measure of quality of life, we firmly reject it.”84  
The Massachusetts court voiced a common criticism of qualitative 
futility.85 While it is acceptable for someone, of their own volition, to forgo 
medical treatment based on their future quality of life,86 a physician cannot 
reasonably determine when a life becomes worthless any more than “nine 
people picked at random from the Kansas City telephone directory.”87 In 
fact, doctors can be “poor predictors of a patient’s quality of life.”88 The 
difficulty in selecting the physician as the sole arbiter of the value of life is 
that families, surrogates, doctors, ethicists, and theologians all consider the 
life of an individual in different ways.89 
The fundamental problem with both the quantitative and qualitative 
approach to determining medical futility lies in deciding who has the power 
to judge whether the life is valuable enough to justify the treatment.90 The 
definitional approach places the power to make life-and-death value 
judgments in the hands of physicians who, even with their many medical 
qualifications, are unqualified to determine the value of another person’s 
life.91 Because the concepts of medical futility, value of life, and likelihood 
of recovery are complex, ambiguous, and subjective, determining these 
“concepts solely from the perspectives of healthcare professionals would not 
be valuable, because their perspective toward utility [quantitative] and 
outcome [qualitative] may differ from that of the patients and their 
families.”92 In making a medical futility determination based on a 
definitional approach to futility, the views of the patient, family, and 
surrogate are not considered.93  
                                                           
82 Id. at 34. 
83 Id. at 39. 
84 Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 432 (Mass. 1977). 
85 See Pope, Medical Futility Statutes, supra note 81, at 40.  
86 See Pope Pius XII, supra note 30, at 329. 
87 Cruzan v. Dir. Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 293 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
88 Pope, Medical Futility Statutes, supra note 81, at 40. 
89 Eric Gampel, Does Professional Autonomy Protect Medical Futility Judgments?, 20 
BIOETHICS 92, 95 (2006).  
90 See, e.g., Truog, supra note 11, at 987.  
91 See Pope, Medical Futility Statutes, supra note 81, at 41–42.  
92 Aghabarary & Dehghan, supra note 64. 
93 Id.  
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Patient autonomy is fundamental to medical decision-making.94 
When the patient is incompetent, this power passes to the surrogate, often 
the family.95 By judging futility only from one perspective, all the power is 
given to the doctors who, under the definitional approach, are not required 
to inform the surrogate of treatment options.96 The value judgment about a 
human being’s worth and their quality of life are based on percentages, 
calculated impassively by a doctor.97 When the question of “who has the 
power to demand treatment and who has the power to say no”98 is judged 
by the definitional approach, it is the doctor who holds all the power. The 
viewpoint of those who know the patient best—namely, the family—is 
excluded.99 This faulty allocation of decision-making power eventually led 
to the abandonment of the definitional approach for a new, process-based 
approach. Unfortunately, the same problem of a faulty allocation of 
decision-making power still cripples the new process-based approach.  
III.  THE PROCESS-BASED APPROACH TO MEDICAL FUTILITY 
With little consensus about “what sort of life, what sort of existence, 
is worth the deployment of medical resources,”100 the definitional approach 
to medical futility suggested by Schneiderman became controversial.101 
Schneiderman’s definitional approach failed to properly balance the 
competing factors in medical futility disputes and could not properly justify 
physicians making value-laden decisions.102 In 1999, the Council on Ethical 
and Judicial Affairs of the American Medical Association (the Council) 
noted the difficulty in defining “futile intervention.”103 Instead, the Council 
proposed a process-based approach to “determining, and subsequently 
withholding or withdrawing, what is felt to be futile care.”104  
 The process-based approach seeks to balance the different 
competing aspects of the definitional approach and provide a process to 
resolve medical futility cases—an area where the “absolute rule” from the 
                                                           
94 See Kathleen M. Boozang, An Intimate Passing: Restoring the Role of Family and Religion 
in Dying, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 549, 565 (1997). 
95 See id. at 566–67. 
96 Schneiderman et al., Medical Futility: Its Meaning, supra note 41, at 949.  
97 Id. at 950. 
98 Truog, supra note 11, at 987.  
99 See Aghabarary & Dehghan, supra note 64. 
100 Pope, Dispute Resolution Mechanisms, supra note 19, at 367. 
101 Robert Sibbald, James Downar & Laura Hawryluck, Perceptions of “Futile Care” Among 
Caregivers in Intensive Care Units, 177 CAN. MED. ASS’N J. 1201, 1205 (2007). 
102 Pope, Dispute Resolution Mechanisms, supra note 19, at 367. 
103 Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Medical Futility in End-of-Life Care, 281 J. AM. 
MED. ASS’N 937, 937 (1999).  
104 Id. at 940. 
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definitional approach failed.105 This approach contains features similar to 
the hearings and proceedings in traditional court cases because, while “a 
perfect and objective reconstruction of a case” and an objective futility 
determination “can be impossible,” such proceedings can give the decision-
makers a better understanding of the issues.106 
 The TADA has served as a leading model for the process 
approach to dispute resolution,107 and several states have taken steps to 
replicate the TADA and adopt it as their dispute resolution mechanism.108 
The TADA shares several of the key characteristics of the procedure 
suggested by the Council, including the establishment of an ethics 
committee,109 attempts to transfer care to those willing to provide treatment 
for the patient,110 and final termination of futile care.111 The TADA serves as 
an illustrative model to demonstrate the faulty allocation of decision-making 
power inherent in the process-based approach to futility disputes. 
 The TADA arose out of a procedure to resolve medical futility 
disputes proposed by several major hospitals in Houston, Texas.112 The goal 
was to unite healthcare providers under a common policy to protect 
themselves, both ethically and legally.113 However, this was impractical 
because the policy had no legal force and thus failed to give doctors 
protection from malpractice suits.114 
 In February 1997, the TADA, which incorporated the Houston 
hospitals’ dispute resolution procedures, was passed through the Texas 
Senate115 and the House116 but was vetoed by Governor George W. Bush.117 
Governor Bush vetoed the bill because it contained “several provisions that 
would permit a physician to deny life-sustaining medical treatment to a 
                                                           
105 Id. at 937. 
106 Id. at 939. 
107 Pope, Procedural Due Process, supra note 13, at 95. 
108 Id. at 107–08 (stating that Idaho, Virginia, and New Jersey have attempted to copy the 
TADA and that other professional organizations have endorsed the TADA, including 
medical associations in California, North Carolina, Washington, and Wisconsin, as well as 
the New York State Bar Association and other organizations in Maryland and Connecticut).  
109 Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, supra note 103, at 939.  
110 Compare id. (“[An] arrangement may be made for transfer to another physician within the 
institution . . . . If this path is taken, the transferring institution should be supportive and 
helpful in the process and the accepting institution and physicians should be comfortable 
honoring the patient’s and/or proxy’s wishes.”), with TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 
166 (West 2019). 
111 Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, supra note 103, at 939.  
112 Pope, Procedural Due Process, supra note 13, at 111.  
113 Id. at 111–12. 
114 Id. 
115 S. 75-13, 75th Sess., at 227 (Tex. 1997). 
116 H.R. 75-84, 75th Sess., at 3861 (Tex. 1997). 
117 Proclamation by the Governor of the State of Texas (June 20, 1997). 
11
Sergeant: Playing God: Faulty Decision-Making in Medical Futility Disputes
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2021
2020] PLAYING GOD: FAULTY DECISION-MAKING 407 
patient who desired them.”118 Additionally, the bill in its original form would 
eliminate the “objective standard” for reviewing certain physician conduct 
and instead replace it with a “subjective ‘good faith’ standard.”119 The bill 
was modified to revise the sections that concerned Governor Bush, and it 
went into effect on September 1, 1999.120 
  While the TADA is a lengthy and complex document, the 
section on resolving medical futility disputes is comparatively short.121 The 
dispute resolution mechanism is triggered when the patient or surrogate 
requests life-sustaining treatment, but the “doctor believes that it is not 
medically appropriate.”122 Once the physician refuses to comply and deliver 
the requested treatment, the dispute will be reviewed by the healthcare 
facilities ethics committee.123 Ethics committees are often composed of 
nurses, doctors, hospital staff, and members of the community.124 While the 
case is before the ethics committee, the TADA requires that life-sustaining 
treatment be maintained for the patient.125 The patient or surrogate must 
receive notification of the review by the ethics committee within forty-eight 
hours of a meeting about the case.126 The surrogate is entitled to attend the 
meeting but is not entitled to participate or advocate for the patient.127 Once 
a decision has been reached during the review process, the ethics committee 
must provide the surrogate with a written explanation of its decision.128 If the 
committee and the attending physician both agree that life-sustaining 
treatment is inappropriate, and the surrogate still insists on continuing 
treatment, then attempts will be made to transfer the patient to another 
healthcare provider.129 
 The physician or healthcare facilities must provide the surrogate 
with a list of alternative facilities that may be willing to accept the patient.130 
However, transfer to another facility is generally unlikely because other 
facilities are often unwilling to take cases already embroiled in a futility 
dispute.131 The surrogate has ten days to find an alternative healthcare 
provider willing to accept the patient, during which time life-sustaining 
                                                           
118 Id.  
119 Id.  
120 See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166 (West 2019). 
121 Id. § 166.046(e). 
122 Id. § 166.052. 
123 Id. 
124 Truog, supra note 11, at 1000.  




129 Id. § 166.046(d). 
130 Id. 
131 Truog, supra note 11, at 1001. 
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treatment will be continued.132 The ten-day waiting period begins once the 
ethics committee delivers its written decision stating that life-sustaining 
treatment is no longer appropriate.133 In the unlikely event that the surrogate 
does find another facility willing to accept the patient, the patient is 
responsible for the cost of the transfer.134  
 If, at the end of the ten-day waiting period, an alternative 
healthcare provider has not been found, the healthcare facility will continue 
to administer pain management treatment but is no longer obligated to 
provide life-sustaining medical treatment.135 The facility may even remove 
nutrition and hydration if the physician believes that it would, among other 
factors, “hasten the patient’s death” or “be medically ineffective in 
prolonging life . . . .”136 
 The only point at which the surrogate has the right to intervene 
on behalf of the patient is during the ten-day waiting period.137 During this 
period, the surrogate may petition the court to extend the waiting period but 
only if “the court finds that there is a reasonable expectation that the 
[surrogate] may find a physician or health care facility willing to provide life-
sustaining treatment if the extension is granted.”138  
 In the process-based approach to resolving medical futility 
disputes under the TADA, the ultimate decision-maker between the 
physician and the surrogate is the ethics committee.139 The ethics committee 
is the sole arbitrator of the merits of the futility dispute between the doctor 
and the surrogate,140 and it acts as “a surrogate judge and jury, with the 
statutory power to authorize clinicians to take life or death actions against 
the wishes of a patient or family.”141 The same problem of faulty allocation 
of decision-making power discussed above with the definitional approach 
arises again because the TADA allocates all of the decision-making power 
to the ethics committee, and almost no power or influence is reserved for 
the family or surrogate.142 
 Firstly, while the TADA has been held up as a due process 
approach to futility dispute resolution,143 it fails to provide the patient and 
                                                           









141 Truog, supra note 11, at 1000.  
142 See § 166. 
143 Pope, Procedural Due Process, supra note 13, at 129.  
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the surrogate with the fundamental right to be heard.144 The Supreme Court 
has continually noted that “an essential component of procedural [due 
process] is an opportunity to be heard.”145 Under the TADA, in life-and-
death situations, the patient and surrogate have no right to be heard by the 
ethics committee.146 They may be present during the meeting and must 
receive a written report of the decision and medical reports, but they have 
no right to participate or advocate for the patient.147 This structure fails to 
comport with the “fundamental requirement” outlined by the Supreme 
Court for due process because the patient and surrogate are denied their 
right to be heard and have no statutory mechanism for making their wishes 
and concerns known to the ethics committee.148 
 Secondly, in addition to denying the surrogate their right to be 
heard, the ethics committee under the TADA lacks another fundamental 
feature of due process: appellate review.149 As Thaddeus Mason Pope noted, 
“procedural due process requires ‘meaningful appellate review.’”150 In the 
case of futility disputes, appellate review is critically necessary and 
“‘meaningful’ if it prevents the arbitrary deprivation of life or liberty.”151 The 
ethics committee’s decisions are, by definition and design, life-or-death 
decisions because they determine whether life-sustaining treatment will be 
continued.152 
 For example, in court decisions regarding death penalty cases, 
where life-and-death decisions are made, the courts impose a “thoughtful 
and effective appellate review, focusing upon the circumstances present in 
each particular case.”153 In medical futility cases, where the dispute centers 
around treatment that “sustains the life of a patient and without which the 
patient will die,” a decision to remove treatment by the ethics committee is 
almost assuredly final and irrevocable, for it results in the patient’s death.154 
Under the structure outlined by the TADA, the courts can only intervene 
                                                           
144 See generally § 166.052; see also Pope, Procedural Due Process, supra note 13, at 146–
47. 
145 Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986).  
146 See § 166.052. 
147 Id. 
148 Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 540 (1986). As noted by Pope, hospitals in Texas are free to 
allow surrogate participation and have allowed surrogates the ability to confront and cross-
examine but no provision of the TADA explicitly gives the surrogates this right. Pope, 
Procedural Due Process, supra note 13, at 147. 
149 See § 166.052. 
150 Pope, Procedural Due Process, supra note 13, at 135 (citing Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 
308, 321 (1991)). 
151 Id.  
152 See § 166.052. 
153 Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 53 (1984). 
154 See § 166.052. 
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and provide appellate review in order to extend the ten-day waiting period.155 
They are not able to review the actual futility determination or the process 
employed by the ethics committee.156 Hospitals and their ethics committees 
have “near-absolute (unreviewable) power over when to terminate 
treatment.”157  
 In addition to granting the ethics committee near-absolute power 
over the life and death of the patient, the TADA provides no guidance on 
the composition of the committee.158 Pope notes that a “fair tribunal is a 
basic requirement of due process” and requires a “neutral and detached 
judge.”159 Ethics committees are far from neutral, as they are made up of 
physicians, nurses, and other hospital staff, and are augmented by 
“community members” who are “often grateful patients of the hospital.”160 
They are “insiders” who have the mindset of the hospital and act in the best 
interest of the institution, not the individual.161 Thus, while the TADA seeks 
to attain a due-process-based resolution, it places the power of life-and-death 
decisions firmly in the hands of a committee with no appellate review and a 
bias in favor of the hospital,162 and with no input or advocation for the patient 
by the surrogate. This lack of due process arises out of a more fundamental 
problem shared with the definitional approach: the faulty allocation of 
decision-making power solely into the hands of the ethics committee.163 The 
primary issue still remains, namely, “who has the power to demand 
treatment, and who has the power to say no.”164 Under the TADA, as well 
as under the definitional approach, it is hospital insiders and not those with 
an intimate knowledge of the patient who make the ultimate decision over 
life and death. 
IV.  THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 
The problem of a faulty allocation of decision-making power can 
be solved, or at least mitigated, by integrating the precautionary principle, a 
standard of environmental law, into medical futility disputes. Essentially, the 
precautionary principle would give patients and surrogates decision-making 
power and require physicians to prove their case in front of a neutral court.165 
                                                           
155 Id. 
156 Id. 
157 Pope, Procedural Due Process, supra note 13, at 136.  
158 Id. at 118, 132. 
159 Id. at 131–32. 
160 Truog, supra note 11, at 1000. 
161 Id.  
162 Id. at 1002. 
163 Id. at 987. 
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165 See supra pp. 24–26; see also infra pp. 28–29.  
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Before considering how the precautionary principle can accomplish this, it 
is important to understand what the precautionary principle is. 
The precautionary principle is a decision-making tool used in 
environmental law and regulation that seeks to balance science, ethics, 
politics, and the law to achieve “pro-active environmental protection and 
management.”166 There are many different formulations of this principle, 
but one common formulation comes from the World Health Organization, 
which has stated that “in cases of serious or irreversible threats to the health 
of humans or ecosystems, acknowledged scientific uncertainty should not 
be used as a reason to postpone preventive measures.”167 In other words, 
when there is a risk of serious harm, preventative measures should be used 
until it is scientifically certain that no harm will occur.168  The precautionary 
principle embodies the adage coined by Benjamin Franklin, “a stitch in time 
saves nine.”169  
 There are three aspects of the precautionary principle that make 
it an ideal tool to use in medical futility disputes. Firstly, the precautionary 
principle is triggered when future harm becomes a possibility.170 The harm 
involved is not a present or existing harm but is one that could occur at some 
future date.171 Because the precautionary principle is essentially a “stop and 
think” approach, the risk of harm must still be in the future.172  
Secondly, the risk of harm contemplated in the precautionary 
principle must be a serious risk.173 The degree of risk serves two purposes: 
firstly, it serves as a trigger for the precautionary principle,174 and secondly, 
it justifies shifting the burden of proof to the party causing the risk.175 Some 
critics of the precautionary principle have pointed out that the indefinite 
nature of the potential harm would cripple the current system of regulation 
and growth.176 Other critics have stated that having a low level of risk serving 
                                                           
166 INTERPRETING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 12 (Timothy O’Riorden & James 
Cameron eds., 1994). 
167 Marco Martuzzi & Joel A. Tickner, Introduction — The Precautionary Principle: 
Protecting Public Health, the Environment and the Future of Our Children, in THE 
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE: PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH, THE ENVIRONMENT AND THE 
FUTURE OF OUR CHILDREN 7 (Marco Martuzzi & Joel A. Tickner ed., 2004), 
https://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/91173/E83079.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/T2X6-FKGM]. 
168 See id.  
169 A stich in time saves nine, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY (4th ed. 2013). 
170 See Noah M. Sachs, Rescuing the Strong Precautionary Principle from Its Critics, U. ILL. 
L. REV. 1285, 1312 (2011). 
171 See id. at 1295. 
172 Id. at 1296.  
173 Id. 
174 See id. at 1334. 
175 See id. at 1333. 
176 See id. at 1305. 
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as the trigger for the precautionary principle would cripple the parties in red 
tape and prevent useful and necessary development.177 However, when the 
risk of harm rises to the level of “serious or irreversible damage,”178 these 
concerns disappear179 because the severity of the risk rises to such a point 
that it cannot be ignored or set aside.180 
Thirdly, there is the issue of scientific uncertainty inherent in the 
precautionary principle.181 In the realm of environmental impact, it can be 
difficult or even impossible to determine the full extent of a potential harm 
before the harm occurs.182 The World Health Organization stated that “this 
kind of uncertainty is inherent in novel or complex systems in which existing 
models do not apply.183 Currently, the party seeking to maintain the 
environmental status quo has the burden of proving “the fact of the 
pollution, the source, and the resulting harm.”184 However, the 
precautionary principle allows regulators—those seeking to maintain the 
environmental status quo—to impose safety requirements, even when they 
are not able to come to a scientifically certain determination of what the 
potential risk could be.185 
Critics of the precautionary principle have stated that basing policy 
arguments on uncertainty rather than verified scientific hypotheses is 
“profoundly damaging to science and society.”186 This view does not 
conform with a proper understanding of decision-making in the face of 
uncertainty.187 The precautionary principle presupposes a situation where 
scientific certainty is lacking, and thus, seeking out scientific certainty when 
there is none to be had is illogical.188 When a proposed action is irreversible 
and can have catastrophic consequences, then it is logical to employ 
                                                           
177 See id.  
178 Lesley Wexler, Limiting the Precautionary Principle: Weapons Regulation in the Face of 
Scientific Uncertainty, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 459, 503 (2006). 
179 Sachs, supra note 171, at 1292.  
180 See id. at 1293.   
181 Id. at 1295.  
182 See id. at 1318. 
183 See Ted Schettler & Carolyn Raffensperger, Why Is a Precautionary Approach Needed?, 
in THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE: PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH, THE ENVIRONMENT 
AND THE FUTURE OF OUR CHILDREN 70 (Marco Martuzzi & Joel A. Tickner ed., 2004), 
https://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/91173/E83079.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/T2X6-FKGM]. 
184 James M. Olson, Shifting the Burden of Proof: How the Common Law Can Safeguard 
Nature and Promote an Earth Ethic, 20 ENVTL. L. 891, 899 (1990). 
185 See Schettler & Raffensperger, supra note 184, at 70.  
186 Gregory D. Fullem, The Precautionary Principle: Environmental Protection in the Face 
of Scientific Uncertainty, 31 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 495, 499 (1995) (quoting Patrick 
Michaels, Environmental Rules Should Be Based on Science, INSIGHT ON THE NEWS 1, 21 
(Apr. 12, 1993)). 
187 See id.  
188 See id. at 501. 
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prudence even if there is some uncertainty as to the risk of harm.189 Even a 
small risk of a sufficiently severe harm would provide the incentive for 
exercising caution.190 For example, a thrill-seeker jumping out of a plane 
without a reserve parachute is considered reckless, not because it is unlikely 
that his first parachute will not open, but because of the dire consequences 
should the first fail.  
While it is true that the precautionary principle does not 
incorporate a threshold for the severity of the harm required to trigger the 
principle, it is only meant to serve as a framework in which regulatory bodies 
and organizations function.191 It is up to the legislature to determine what 
level of risk is sufficient to trigger the principle.192 
 While there are many different formulations of the precautionary 
principle, they can generally be grouped into two categories: the strong and 
weak principles.193 An often-cited formulation of the weak precautionary 
principle was adopted by 172 countries (including the United States) at the 
Earth Summit in what became known as the Rio Declaration.194 The 
declaration states that “[i]n order to protect the environment, the 
precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States according to their 
capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack 
of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-
effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.”195   
 On the other hand, Professor Noah M. Sachs provides a common 
formulation of the strong precautionary principle.196 This two-part 
formulation states that: 
(1) regulation should presumptively be applied when an 
activity or product poses serious threats to human health 
or the environment, even if scientific uncertainty precludes 
a full understanding of the nature or extent of the threats; 
and (2) the burden of overcoming the presumption in favor 
                                                           
189 Id. 
190 Id. 
191 Sachs, supra note 171, at 1297.  
192 Id. 
193 See Andrew Jordan & Timothy O’Riordan, The Precautionary Principle: A Legal and 
Policy History, in THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE: PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH, THE 
ENVIRONMENT AND THE FUTURE OF OUR CHILDREN 1, 37 (2004), 
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194 Sachs, supra note 171, at 1292. 
195 U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on Environment 
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of regulation lies with the proponent of the risk-creating 
activity or product.197 
While both the weak and strong principles contain elements of 
risks of future harm, a risk of serious harm, and scientific uncertainty, there 
are several important differences.198 The weak precautionary principle, as 
outlined in the Rio Declaration, permits but does not require regulatory 
bodies to impose preventative measures.199 On the other hand, the strong 
precautionary principle states that preventative measures or “regulation[s] 
should presumptively be applied” when there is a serious threat to “human 
health or the environment.”200 This presumption favors those trying to 
protect the environment instead of those seeking to alter it.201 
 Additionally, the strong precautionary principle imposes a 
reversal or shifting of the burden of proof.202 This reversal of proof requires 
the party attempting to carry out the activity to prove that it will not cause 
harm before the activity is undertaken.203 This shifting of the burden is 
employed in the stronger versions of the precautionary principle because, 
with more weighty interests involved, the creators of the risk must be forced 
to properly analyze the risk and show that their actions will not cause harm.204   
 The precautionary principle also forces proponents of their 
activities to prove their case in front of the existing court system.205 For 
example, if the precautionary principle were codified under a federal statute, 
then the parties advocating for activities would have to prove their case in 
front of a court, just like those trying to limit regulatory action.206 Thus, both 
parties are brought before a neutral and fair tribunal to determine the merits 
of a precautionary principle dispute, providing for “a basic requirement of 
due process.”207  
Finally, as the definition suggests, the final goal of the precautionary 
principle is to anticipate possible harms and mitigate them as much as 
possible.208 This idea is exemplified in the world of medicine by Hippocrates 
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who stated, “first, do no harm.”209 The precautionary principle is, first and 
foremost, a decision-making tool that requires the creators of an 
environmental risk to demonstrate that their proposed actions will not cause 
harm before the action is taken.210  
V.  APPLYING THE PRECAUTIONARY 
PRINCIPLE TO MEDICAL FUTILITY 
 The precautionary principle applied to medical futility disputes 
helps solve the problem of faulty allocation of decision-making power by 
giving the surrogate the power to make treatment decisions and requiring 
the physician to prove his or her position before a neutral and detached 
tribunal. In medical futility disputes, the physician or other party seeking to 
terminate life-sustaining treatment is seeking to change the status quo,211 and 
thus, in precautionary principle terms, they are the party creating the risk.212 
Conversely, the surrogate or party who desires to continue life-sustaining 
treatment is the party seeking to maintain the status quo,213 similar to a 
regulatory body seeking to preserve environmental equilibrium under the 
precautionary principle.214  
Additionally, in a medical futility dispute, the risk involved is not 
specifically that the patient will die because, in the vast majority of cases, the 
patient does die.215 Instead, the risk that the parties face is that of premature 
termination whereby, if the patient could be kept alive, advances in 
medicine could help restore the patient.216  
The precautionary principle is particularly well suited for use in 
medical futility disputes because of the severity of risk that triggers the 
principle.217 The precautionary principle contains no specific gravity 
threshold to trigger the principle;218 however, with futility disputes, the 
severity of the risk is sufficient to warrant precaution.219 The Court in Cruzan 
noted that the “choice between life and death is a deeply personal decision 
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of obvious and overwhelming finality.”220 These “serious or irreversible 
damages” are exactly what the precautionary principle is designed to 
protect.221  
Under the precautionary principle, the party who creates the risk 
and carries out the activity—in the context of medical futility, premature 
termination—has the burden of proving that such actions will not cause 
harm.222 Applying this principle to medical futility disputes, the physician 
would have the burden of showing that removing life-sustaining treatment 
will not cause the premature death of the patient because it is the removal 
of treatment that creates a risk of premature death.223 
Shifting the burden to the party who causes the risk in medical 
futility cases has already been approved by the Supreme Court in Cruzan.224 
While the roles were reversed—the family seeking termination and the 
physicians opposing—the Court noted that those who were seeking 
termination of treatment were creating a “risk of an erroneous decision.”225 
The Court found it proper for the state of Missouri to place a “more 
stringent burden of proof” on the parties causing the risk of premature 
termination, instead of burdening those advocating for the maintenance of 
the status quo.226  
Applying the precautionary principle to medical futility disputes 
would have a similar effect, placing “the onus . . . on the proponent [the 
physician] to prove that an activity is safe [avoids premature termination] 
rather than for its opponents [the surrogates] to prove that it is unsafe.”227 
Thus, in order for the doctor to terminate care, he or she would have to 
meet or exceed a specified burden of proof.228   
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This shift in the burden to the physician is contrary to how 
traditional medical futility disputes are generally decided.229 Under the 
definitional approach, doctors have all the decision-making power, and the 
surrogate has an almost insurmountable burden to overcome if they want to 
disprove the doctor because the futility determinations can be made without 
the surrogate’s input.230 Under the process-based approach outlined in the 
TADA, the doctors still generally have the ultimate decision-making power 
because the hospital ethics committees almost always side with the hospital 
and their doctors.231 By incorporating the precautionary principle, the family 
or surrogate would retain more decision-making power because the 
physicians would be forced to prove their case in court prior to terminating 
life support.232 Thus, the family, who generally knows the patient’s wishes 
and values best, would presumptively hold the power to make the critical 
value-laden decisions required in a medical futility dispute.233 
Applying the precautionary principle to medical futility does not 
necessarily mean that physicians can never withhold medically futile 
treatment.234 Instead, the physicians would have to “make a persuasive case 
for what they wish to do and must accept responsibility for it.”235  
 Incorporating the precautionary principle into the medical futility 
debate should also involve a neutral and detached arbitrator for the disputes 
between physician and surrogate.236 As with traditional regulatory challenges, 
challenges to the precautionary principle are brought into court to be 
decided by a judge.237 Similarly, futility disputes should not be brought to a 
panel of hospital insiders.238  Rather, they should be treated like other 
disputes. 239 Pope noted that due process in a medical futility dispute requires 
a “neutral and detached judge.”240 Bringing these disputes before a judge, 
just like an environmental challenge, would ensure an unbiased tribunal and 
better achieve the goals of due process.241  
                                                           
229 See, e.g., Darren P. Mareiniss, A Comparison of Cruzan and Schiavo the Burden of Proof, 
Due Process, and Autonomy in the Persistently Vegetative Patient, 26 J. LEGAL MED. 233, 
243 (2005). 
230 See generally Schneiderman et al., Medical Futility: Its Meaning, supra note 41, at 951. 
231 Truog, supra note 11, at 1000. 
232 Id. 
233 Pearce, supra note 228, at 57.   
234 Schettler & Raffensperger, supra note 184, at 78. 
235 Id. 
236 See Pope, Procedural Due Process, supra note 13, at 131. 
237 See Natural Res. Def. Council v. E.P.A., 859 F.2d 156, 170 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (illustrating 
where the court has the power and authority to limit the EPA’s regulatory authority).  
238 Pope, Procedural Due Process, supra note 13, at 133. 
239 Truog, supra note 11, at 1000. 
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 Consider the far-reaching effect that the precautionary principle 
would have in the case of Tinslee Lewis, as discussed in the introduction. 
Tinslee’s mother, who is already burdened by the possibility of losing her 
child, would not have to pursue her case through the Texas Court of 
Appeals.242 Instead, the physicians who want to terminate the only treatment 
keeping Tinslee alive would have the burden of pursuing their case against 
Tinslee.243 Through their attempts to remove life support, Tinslee’s 
physicians are creating a risk of “serious or irreversible damage,”244 which is 
the risk that the child will die before a cure is found.245 The precautionary 
principle would require the physicians to prove that they will not cause any 
harm, not before a biased committee of hospital insiders,246 but in front of a 
neutral and impartial court.247 Doing so would guarantee baby Tinslee the 
due process she deserves.248  
 There is no question that Tinslee Lewis will die. Even Tinslee’s 
mother stated, “I know that everybody has to pass away, but my fear is them 
pulling the plug on her with me not being able to make the decision first.”249 
Applying the precautionary principle to her medical futility dispute would 
give the decision-making power to Tinslee’s mother, who is trying to 
preserve her life. Under the precautionary principle, this ability to make 
medical decisions would be restored to Tinslee’s mother, instead of being 
given to physicians playing god, choosing life or death for Tinslee. 
                                                           
242 See Pearce, supra note 228, at 57.   
243 Sachs, supra note 171, at 1295. 
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